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I. A New View of Corruption, Development and Culture
A silent revolution has taken place during the last decade or two. Not only has corruption
and its detrimental consequences been brought into focus, but the prospects of fighting
corruption have also improved dramatically.
Twenty or thirty years ago, the general view was that corruption in the south-the de-
veloping world-was a part of its underdevelopment or perhaps even a consequence of such
underdevelopment. The conclusion was that economic development had to take place first
and only then would it be possible to fight corruption. There was also a high degree of
cultural relativism. Corruption was seen as part of the culture of many, if not all, developing
countries.
This approach was very similar to that regarding human rights. There was at the time a
view that you could not demand that a poor country respect human rights because it had
to be developed, as it was sometimes expressed. Now all this has changed-the basic notion
is just the opposite. Corruption is now seen as a cause of poverty, not merely a consequence.
Honesty and integrity, as well as democracy and human rights, are seen as necessary steps
in the work to bring about development. It is no longer possible to justify corruption and
oppression on the ground that they are part of the culture, even though some one-party
regimes still maintain such a view.
H. Corruption in Industrialized Countries
The legitimacy to address corruption in both the south and the east, namely the former
Communist countries,1 stems from the fact that we are now more prepared to admit that
corruption also exists in the so-called developed world (the OECD countries-the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development), and we are more prepared to dis-
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1. These countries are often referred to as transition countries. See THE WORLD BANK, ANTICORRUPTION IN
TRANSITION: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE POLICY DEBATE 13 (Sept. 30, 2000), available at www.worldbank.org/
wbi/govemance/pdf/contribution.pdf.
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cuss ways to combat corruption. In other words, corruption exists independently of the
level of development. So there is no reason not to attack it wherever it turns up.
It is another matter that the degree of corruption is higher in the south and the east.
The OECD countries rank seven to eight on a scale of one to ten, whereas the countries
of the south and the east rank between three and four, according to Transparency Inter-
national's (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index.'
Ill. The Asia Crisis
Even in Asia, which has traditionally had a high level of acceptance of corruption, a new
view has emerged.' One reason is that corruption is seen as a major cause of the financial
crisis that hit East Asia in 1997, particularly in Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand. The
previous view that corruption facilitated decision-making and thus helped economic pro-
gress in the region is no longer viable. It is more fitting to say that progress was achieved
in spite of existing corruption.
IV. The Effects of Corruption
The damaging effects of corruption are much better known, understood, and acknowl-
edged now than they were twenty to thirty years ago. Research has demonstrated in a
convincing way that corruption causes great damage to a society. A high level of corruption
in a country reduces investment and the inflow of capital.4 In addition, it also reduces
efficiency because money is spent on the wrong projects. The result is a reduction in eco-
nomic growth.'
.Not only is corruption an obstacle to development, but it is also unfair. A company that
wins a contract using bribes is not acting fairly and is, in fact, distorting competition.
Corruption is unfair to poor people as well because it reduces funds available for social
sector spending and because it costs poor people relatively more to pay bribes for societal
services such as medical care and schooling for their children. 6 Besides, corruption renders
government regulation ineffective because it generates non-compliance with requirements
for safety, public health, and environmental protection.7
V. The Magnitude of Corruption
Previously, the prevailing view was that it was not possible to measure corruption and
consequently not possible to know the volume of corruption. But various institutions have
2. Press Release, Transparency International, Nine Out of Ten Countries Urgently Need Practical Support
to Fight Corruption (Oct. 7, 2003), available at http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases-archive/ 2003/dnld/
cpi2003 .pressrelease.en.pdf.
3. Press Release, Transparency International, Corruption in South Asia: Insights & Benchmarks from Citizen
Feedback Surveys in Five Countries (Dec. 17, 2002), available at http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases-
archive/2002/dnld/south-asia-report.pdf.
4. Daniel Kaufmann, Anticorruption Strategies: Starting Afresh? Unconventional Lessonsfrom ComparativeAnal-
ysis, in CURBING CORRUPTION: TOWARD A MODEL FOR BUILDING NATIONAL INTEGRITY 35, 45-46 (Rick Stapen-
burst & Sahr J. Kpundeh eds., 1999).
5. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, ANTI-CORRUPTION PRACTICE NOTE (Feb. 2004), available
at http://www.undp.org/policy/practicenotes.htm [hereinafter ANTI-CORRUPTION PRACTICE NOTE].
6. Id.
7. Id.
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now been able to fashion instruments that allow for a fairly reliable measurement of the
magnitude of corruption in various sectors and countries.8 For instance, the World Bank
makes diagnostics for a school system in a specific country.9 If one translates the figures
they have collected into a global figure the magnitude is estimated at one trillion U.S.
dollars, which corresponds to 3 percent of the global income in 2002.10
The sectors most prone to corruption seem to be public infrastructure, the arms industry,
and the extractive industries. In addition, state-controlled industries, in general, and banks
are high-corruption environments. Low-corruption sectors include agriculture, fishery, and
light industry. Within the public sector police, prosecutors, courts, customs, and the tax
administration are afflicted. The informal sector is very large in the south. Companies in
this sector escape formal taxation, but are subject to a number of other costs, such as bribes
to police and other authorities that they must offer in order to operate.
VI. Public Opinion
The spread of corruption and its effects have received enormous publicity thanks to
efforts by various organizations such as TI, Global Forum, and others. Democratization
has facilitated these efforts and the use of the Internet has been crucial to the spread of
knowledge. Even a poor peasant in the south might now possess the insight that corruption
is detrimental-knowledge that carries a powerful potential for change. TI's Corruption
Perceptions Index, which has been publicized since 1995, has had a great impact." Gov-
ernments worry about how they fare in this index, which is used by media and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to attack governments that do not seriously fight cor-
ruption. All governments nowadays pretend (claim) that they fight corruption. TI also
publishes a Bribe Payers Index that gives an account of the likelihood that companies in
industrialised countries pay bribes.l" Companies domiciled in clean countries are least likely
to pay bribes abroad in order to win contracts.
In addition, quite a number of other organizations also influence public opinion. One
example is Global Compact (GC), an international network formed under the auspices of
the United Nations (UN) in 2002. Global Impact's purpose is to promote corporate re-
sponsibility in the world. At the time of its founding, GC adopted nine principles for its
work on human rights, labor conditions, and the environment. It is a sign of the times that
a tenth principle was added in 2004-the fight against corruption. 3 Publish What You Pay
8. Vito Tanzi, Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures, in, 45 IMF STAFF PAPERS
559 (Dec. 1998), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/Pubs/FF/staffp/1998/12-98/tanz.i.htrm.
9. See, e.g., World Bank Institute Programs, Countries Where Diagnostic Tools Have Been Implemented,
available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/capacitybuild/d-surveys.html (last visited Aug. 31,
2005); THE WORLD BANK, CAMBODIA, GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION DIAGNOTIC: EVIDENCE FROM CITIZEN,
ENTERPRISE AND PUBLIC OFFICIAL SURVEYS (May 1, 2000), available at www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/
pdf/guide-pdfs/06-survey-report.pdf.
10. The World Bank, The Costs of Corruption, April 8, 2004, www.worldbank.org.
1I. Nine out of Ten, supra note 2.
12. Press Release, Transparency International, Russian, Chiense, Taiwanese and S. Korean Companies
Widely Seen Using Bribes in Developing Countries (May 14, 2004), available at http://www.transparency.org/
pressreleases-archive/2002/2002.05.14.bpi.en.html.
13. United Nations Procurement Service, Global Compact, http://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/global.htm (last
visited Sept. 12, 2005).
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is another example of an organization that influences public opinion. It is an association of
more than 200 NGOs throughout the world that want to increase the transparency of
payments made by extractive industries. In addition, the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative has also placed on its agenda the increase of transparency regarding payments to
states and states' income deriving from extractive industries. One purpose is to produce
statistics that allow for a comparison of the amounts paid by companies and the amounts
reported by states as income.
VII. Policy Changes of Developmental Institutions
Many developmental institutions-bilateral as well as international financial institu-
tions-have drawn attention to corruption and its damaging effects. The most important
example of this was in 1995 when the President of the World Bank declared war on cor-
ruption, claiming that corruption is the single greatest obstacle to development. Nowadays,
most developmental institutions have specific, anti-corruption programs.14 In addition, they
have established special offices entrusted with the task of fighting corruption in their pro-
grams and within their own organizations. 5
VIII. The Business Community: A New View
There are clear signs that businesses all over the world are increasingly apt to repudiate
bribes. They realize that it is an expensive way of doing business, that it creates a breeding
ground for disloyalty within their own companies, and is becoming more and more dan-
gerous for the top management of the companies. In addition, they also have come to
acknowledge that corruptive practices by a company damage its goodwill.
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) favours self-regulation.16 For this pur-
pose, it has issued guidelines entitled Rules of Conduct on Extortion and Bribery in International
Business Transactions, with its first version drafted in 1977.'1 In addition, the ICC has also
published a handbook, Fighting Corruption: A Corporate Practice Manual, and established the
Commission on Anti-Corruption. 0 The distortion of competition caused by corruption is
a major reason behind the ICC's actions. The World Economic Forum has taken an ini-
tiative as well, called Partnership Against Corruption Initiative. 19 This initiative, launched
in 2004, builds on TI's Business Principles for Countering Bribery. In addition, TI has also
created the Integrity Pact that seeks to counteract corruptive practices with respect to public
procurement.2 0
14. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, SYNTHESIS OF LESSONS LEARNED OF
DONOR PRACTICES IN FIGHTING CORRUPTION 6 (June 23, 2003), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/44/
19936969.pdf.
15. BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESARROLLO, MODERNIZAcI6N DEL EsTADo: DOCUMENTO DE ESTRATEGIA
(July 2003), http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum = 351821.
16. International Chamber of Commerce, Extortion and Bribery in International Business Transaction,
http://www.iccwbo.org/home/statements-rule/rules/1999/briberydoc99.asp(last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
17. Id.
18. International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Celebrates Anti-Corruption Day, Dec. 9, 2004, http://
www.iccwbo.org/home/news-archives/2004/anti-corruption-day.asp.
19. World Economic Forum, Parmering Against Corruption Initiative, http://www.weforum.org/paci (last
visited Sept. 12, 2005).
20. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, BUSINESS PRINCIPALS FOR COUNTERING BRIBERY (July 29, 2005), available
at http://www.transparency.org/building-coalitions/private-sector/business-principles.html.
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IX. Success Stories
There has been a firm belief that corruption is almost impossible to eradicate once it has
taken root in a country. This is not true. That was proven in England once upon a time
and again by the United States in the nineteenth century. Recently the success stories of
Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea provide more evidence. Naturally, these examples
inspire similar efforts in many countries.
X. European Union Enlargement
Candidate countries continue to have a very strong incentive to combat corruption in
order to be eligible for membership in the European Union (EU). The widespread cor-
ruption in the courts, police, and customs authorities in many of these countries has not
been eradicated, but clear progress has been recorded, in terms of awareness of the problem
and reduced acceptance of corruption. The programs Tacis, Phare, and CARDS (Com-
munity Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation) have contributed to
a better understanding and to resolute measures. 2' In fact, the EU effect is great even in
countries that are still far from membership. For example, the Albanian government is
taking aim at the very severe corruption in the country in order to one day be able to qualify
for EU membership.2
XI. Terrorism and Organized Crime
Institutions that are charged with the task of addressing the problems of terrorism and
organized crime-police, prosecutors, customs, etc.-are, of course, much less successful
if they are corrupt themselves. Organized crime weakens the state because those who com-
mit these crimes have resources to finance large-scale corruption and to bribe officials in
the legal system. This has induced the United States and the EU, among others, to help
fight such corruption using political pressure, economic incentives, and technical assistance
in countries where corruption is endemic, such as Indonesia and Pakistan. Money laun-
dering is directly associated with corruption, as it is typically a consequence of criminal
action and in many cases triggers corruption because bribes are a means of getting away
with money laundering and of concealing the underlying crime.
XII. Disasters and Vulnerability
Corruption contributes to man-made disasters by weakening safety systems and hence
lowering thresholds to disasters, such as transport accidents. Corruption also makes the
consequences of disasters-natural or man-made-worse than necessary since the effects
of disasters depend on human planning and respect for the law in the form of safety stan-
dards, land use regulations, warning systems, etc. In a corrupt system, all this might fail.
21. TRANSPARENcY INTERNATIONAL, INTECRITY PACT (Dec. 31, 2002), available at http://www.transparency.
org/building-coalidons/integrity-pact.
22. Tanja Borzel & Thomas Risse, One Size Fits All! EU Policiesfor the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy,
and the Rule of Law (Apr. 27, 2005), www.eu-newgov.org/database/PUBLIC/ P23000-02-CLU302_One-
size-fits-all.pdf.
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The legal system as a whole is relevant for the creation of a secure environment because a
corrupt environment is not a secure environment.
International donors and financial institutions will pay much attention to any misuse of
the funds allocated to the post-tsunami reconstruction in southeast Asia, and the tsunami
might mobilize people to condemn and resist corruption. The governments of Indonesia
and Sri Lanka are aware of the terrible bad-will that it will cause the country if reconstruc-
tion money is misused. It will damage the general reputation of these countries and dis-
courage foreign investment.
XIII. Corruption-A General Definition
The concept of corruption varies from one country to another. Corruption has become
a generic term for a variety of bad phenomena in the public sector. In many countries,
almost any encroachment on state property is labelled as corruption. In Vietnam, a vice-
minister who had sold state property and kept the money was executed for corruption.
There is no generally accepted definition of corruption.2 3 TI has a definition that has
gained wide usage: "misuse of entrusted power for private gain."2 4 The World Bank uses a
similar definition: "use of public office for private gain."2 5 Just about any act committed by
an official could be corruption if it benefited him or her personally. Obviously, this defi-
nition excludes misuse within the private sector, such as bribing the employees of compa-
nies. But it includes misuse in favour of political parties, such as benefits for such parties
or for persons associated with such political parties.
The ICC makes a distinction between bribery and extortion. Extortion is defined by the
OECD as "[t]he solicitation of bribes is the act of asking or enticing another to commit
bribery. It becomes extortion when this demand is accompanied by threats that endanger
the personal integrity or the life of the private actors involved.
2 6
XIV. Corruption-A Legal Definition
It is no problem for an economic analysis of corruption to have a rather vague definition
of corruption. But definitions of a legal character must be more precise. A rather typical
legal definition reads as follows:
whenever a public officer or other agent accepts or solicits a bribe, or any person gives or
promises a bribe to such a public officer or other agent; provided, however, that the purpose
of the bribe is to serve as a reward to the public officer or agent for an act that he has done or
refrained from doing in the exercise of his functions, or as an inducement designed to ensure
23. Tanzi, supra note 8, at 576.
24. Transparency International, Frequently Asked Question About Corruption, http://www.transparency.
org/faqs/faq-corruption.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
25. Cheryl W Gray & Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption and Development, in 35 FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT 7
(Mar. 1998), available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/03/pdf/gray.pdf; see also Daniel Kaufman,
Cormption, Governance and Security: Challenges for the Rich Countries and the World, in THE GLOBAL COMPETI-
TIVENESS REPORT 83 (Michael E. Porter et al. eds., 2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/gover-
nance/pubs/gcr2004.html.
26. THE GLOBAL COMPACT, GUIDANCE DOCUMENT: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 10TH PRINCIPLE AGAINST
CORRUPTION (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/content/NewsDocs/guid-a-corr-
081204.pdf.
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that the public officer or agent does, or refrains from doing, any act, in the exercise of his
functions."
Differing legal concepts are used in different countries but also within countries. For
instance, the concept used in legislation against corruption is often much narrower than
the concept used to lay down the mandate of special bodies set up with the task to fight
corruption. In some jurisdictions, the concept of corruption is very narrow and some ju-
risdictions do not have the crime of corruption or bribery at all, which does not, however,
mean that certain acts, typically regarded as corruption, are lawful. Bolivia is one such
example, whereas Vietnam has a very open-ended definition with very harsh sanctions,
including capital punishment.
In most countries, a distinction is made between the public and the private sectors in so
far as a private employee's abuse of his position for personal gain is not regarded as cor-
ruption. The reason for this differentiation is most likely that a civil servant's abuse damages
faith in public institutions. Another reason is probably that public property is regarded as
more worthy of protection than private property. None of these arguments, however, seems
to be convincing. Trust in the private sector is a societal interest. The latter argument might
be a relapse of the view in the former Communist countries that an attack on public property
was an attack on the system. A tendency can be noted, however, whereby more and more
countries penalize the solicitation or acceptance of bribes by private employees.
Sometimes large corporations attach conditions to their decisions to invest in a country,
such as requiring the host country to invest in infrastructure or change its taxation policy.
Such conditions are sometimes labelled as corruption (state capture). However, as long as
nobody derives a personal advantage from the arrangement, it is dubious to classify such
conditions as corruption.
XV. Types of Corruption
The most conspicuous type of corruption is so-called petty corruption, which includes
bribes to policemen, customs personnel, medical doctors, teachers, etc.2" So-called grand
corruption signifies bribes given in connection with big projects, for example infrastructure
projects or arms sales.2 9 Political corruption-defined as abuse of entrusted power by po-
litical leaders for private gain-is a type of serious grand corruption because it may erode
democracy.
3 °
A special category of grand corruption, known as state capture, implies that a company
influences the legislation of a state, institution, or the governmental policy in an entire area,
for instance the environment, taxation, or mining.31 State capture is common in small coun-
27. W. Paatii Ofosu-Amaah et al., Combating Corruption. A Comparative Review of Selected Legal Aspects
of State Practices and Major International Initiatives 63 (1999).
28. The World Bank, Assessing Political Commitment to Fighting Corruption, in PREMNOTES 29 (Sept. 1999),
available at http://wwwl .worldbank.org/prem/PREMNotes/premnote29.pdf.
29. Id. "Political corruption"-defined as abuse of entrusted power by political leaders for private gain-is
a type of grand corruption that is serious because it may erode democracy.
30. Joel S. Hellman & Daniel Kaufmann, The Inequality of Influence, in BUILDING A TRUsTWORTHY STATE IN
POsT-SoctALIST TRANSITION 100 (Janos Kornai and Susan Rose-Ackerman eds., 2004).
31. JOEL S. HELLMAN ET AL., SEIZE THE STATE, SEIZE THE DAY: STATE CAPTURE, CORRUPTION, AND INFLUENCE
IN TRANSITION 2 (Sept. 2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/seizestate.html.
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tries where a financially strong business group could influence state policy and favour its
interests or stakeholders, for instance political parties. Countries afflicted by state capture
are Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire). Other states that are
examples of grand corruption are the Central Asian countries, such as the former republics
of the Soviet Union.
Sometimes a political system manipulates private companies for personal gain. This type
of reversed state capture could be called "power chasing wealth," in contrast to "wealth
chasing power." Russia can serve as an example of this phenomenon. "Crony bias/crony
capitalism" is at hand when the state, business, and organizations are intertwined in net-
works that can exert influence and gain economic benefits without bribes being paid. It can
take the form of politicians receiving well-paid positions within the private sector or of
state subsidies flowing to private organizations that support the government.
XVI. Corruption and the Political System
There is widespread corruption in democracies as well as in one-party states. The intro-
duction of democracy does not automatically reduce corruption. Low institutional quality
means that corruption is perceived to be high. As soon as people have that perception, the
system loses its legitimacy, tax evasion increases, and the investment climate is affected.
32
Corruption increases inequality and creates inefficiency. For this reason, corruption dam-
ages the legitimacy of a regime whatever its type of governance, whether democratic or
one-party. For example, the leadership in China and Vietnam is well aware of this and tries
by all means to combat corruption.
XVII. Corruption and the Legal System
A weak legal system is conducive to corruption, but corruption also weakens the legal
system. There is a causal relationship both ways. First, a weak legal system is closely related
to an informal economy. The grey zone between poorly working official rules and insti-
tutions on the one hand and the informal law on the other is a breeding ground for cor-
ruption. Most companies prefer to rely on public rules and institutions, but if the state is
incapable of enforcing its own rules effectively and impartially, bribes and private protection
fill the void left by inadequate state enforcement. The absence of the state system, including
the legal system, inhibits investments and transactions.
Next, corruption within the law enforcement administration-police, customs, tax ad-
ministration, coastal administration, etc.-as well as public institutions overseeing this
administration, is devastating for the efficacy of the campaign against corruption, since the
existence of corruption is so closely related to a lack of accountability.3 This also applies
to the judiciary (i.e., prosecutors and judges), which should be the ultimate warrant for
fairness and justice. One cannot expect low-ranking officials to be loyal to the system unless
they have faith in the system and see that their efforts make a difference.
32. Daniel Kaufmann, Governance Redux: the Empirical Challenge, in THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT
(Michael E. Porter et al. eds., 2003), available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govredux.
html.
33. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Governance and Corruption, in GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLtrrIoNs 322 (Bjorn
Lomborg ed. 2002).
VOL. 39, NO. 3
COMBATING CORRUPTION 725
XVIII. Weak States and Weak Governance as Causes
of Corruption
Corrupt countries often have a weak and overburdened state that cannot fulfill its func-
tions or control its own officials. Consequently, the weakening of a state is not the solution
to corruption. On the contrary, the state should be reinforced, not necessarily by becoming
bigger, but rather more effective in fulfilling its core tasks, such as the functioning of its
legal system. The underlying institutional weaknesses must be addressed.3 Corrupt states
are in many instances top-heavy, with the power in the hands of a few. Popular influence
and participation are low, and there is a lack of accountability. Hence, improvement of the
system of governance is the way to go.
XIX. What makes corruption possible?
There are circumstances that directly create opportunities for corruption: state monop-
olies, regulations, the need for official permits, decisions to make public investments, pro-
curement, etc. Some circumstances facilitate corruption. A key determinant is the reward
structure. Bureaucratic traditions that favour recruitment or promotion of officials on ar-
bitrary grounds, as opposed to on the merits, and low salary levels are part of this. Another
determinant is the effectiveness of accountability systems. Lack of transparency, discretion-
ary powers for officials, and room for arbitrary decisions impede accountability. The low
probability of being exposed and lenient consequences for an official, who does get caught,
are also part of an inadequate accountability system. A third factor is the leadership. Cor-
ruption will thrive in the absence of political leadership that is strongly committed to anti-
corruption activities.
As seen, there will be opportunities for corruption in any system. As a matter of fact, the
cleanest countries, like the Nordic countries and the United Kingdom, offer ample oppor-
tunities for corruption. These opportunities cannot be eliminated unless the state abdicates
from its vital functions. The fact that many countries are relatively clean is in other words
not because the opportunities for corruption have been reduced. On the contrary, public
procurement occurs on a large scale, these societies are heavily regulated with quite a num-
ber of subsidy schemes in operation and state monopolies.
XX. The Key Issue?
A strategy to fight corruption must take aim at the system of governance. The higher
the incidence of corruption, the more the strategy should focus on the broad underlying
features of the governance system.3" For example, one strategy is to build the rule of law
and strengthen institutions of accountability. The main issue is how weak states can bring
about fimdamental change of their system of governance in terms of control and sharing
of power (accountability), openness, public attitudes, citizen influence, and trust in public
institutions.3 6
34. Id. at 309.
35. ANWAR SHAH & MARK SCHACTER, COMBATING CoRRUTrnoN: LOOK BEFORE You LEAP, in FINANCE &
DEVELOPMENT 40 (Dec. 2004), available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2004/12/pdf/shah.pdf.
3 6. Michael Johnston & Alan Doig, Different Views on Good Government and Sustainable Anticorruption Strat-
egies, in CURBING CORRUPTION 13 (Rick Stapenhurst & Sahr Kpundeh eds., 1999).
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Bringing about such change is no easy feat. It means challenging influential forces in
society, especially such forces within the state, that benefit from the corruptive practices.
State officials and state institutions that subsist on bribes are supposed to combat that
practice. These officials and institutions are asked to combat themselves. This is why in-
stitutions most in need of anticorruption programs are the institutions least likely to initiate
such programs. It is easier, though, if "key champions"-persons who really want change-
become frustrated and are prepared to fight for that change.
To make progress there must be pressure from below. Popular acceptance of corruption
is a powerful ally of corruption. That acceptance can be broken only if people are made
aware of the societal costs that corruption causes and of what can be feasibly done. But
there is also a need for political commitment, preferably non-partisan, and a leadership that
exerts pressure from above to set a good example. If the top is rotten the bottom will also
be rotten.
XXI. The Economic "Solution"
As stated above, many activities of a modem welfare state create opportunities for cor-
ruption, such as state subsidies, public procurement, regulation of business, high taxation,
land use planning, construction standards, safety regulation, and environmental protection.
The greater the state intervention in the economy, the greater the opportunities for cor-
ruption. The ability of an official to provide a private partner protection in the market will
depend upon the openness of the market to external (imports) and internal competition.
Economists would therefore stress deregulation, privatization, market entry to increase
competition, macroeconomic soundness, etc., as ways to come to grips with the presumed
root causes of corruption. Much of the work of development institutions has such an ori-
entation or at least the strategies of the institutions have such a focus.,,
However, economic reform cannot solve the problem. The economic solution requires
a minimal state, because its pillars are deregulation, privatization, and market openness.
Many countries undeniably suffer from over-regulation and inefficient state monopolies
and these should be reduced. But a modem welfare state will always need the types of
activities mentioned above. Economic policy can make a difference, but it cannot provide
a final solution.
XXII. The Role of the Legal System
A. IN GENERAL
Most or all types of action needed for combating corruption require a basis in the legal
system to be effective. Lawyers and politicians have misunderstood the role of law when
they stress only criminal law. There is a need for quite a number of legal rules and devices
to counteract corruption-rules that provide for openness, checks and balances, a merit-
based system for officials, privatization, independence of media, access to the Internet,
tender procedures, the right to establish a business, protection of property, basic liberties
to organize meetings, reform of taxation, competition law, etc. These rules are necessary
elements for containing corruption, but most of them have no direct bearing on corruption
37. ROBERT KLITGAARD ET AL., CORRUPT CITIES: A PLAcTIcAL GUIDE TO CURE AND PREVENTION, (1999).
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as such, and a few persons, lawyers included, would associate these legal rules with the fight
against corruption. Many of these measures could be parts of larger reform programs, such
as civil service or financial management reforms.
Clean countries are not "clean" simply because they have harsh penal law systems, but
because they have strong legal systems and good systems of governance. In fact, many
institutional and economic reforms are legal reforms. For example, the restructuring of the
state business sector often emerges due to reform of bankruptcy legislation. In addition,
the significance of the legal system also is demonstrated by developments in former Soviet
republics and similar countries, where the transition from centrally-planned to market
economies allowed for state capture and administrative corruption.
B. ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY
Accountability includes political, administrative, and financial accountability.38 Emphasis
should be put on systemic reform rather than on individual performance, namely measures
that improve institutions, including institutional culture. Institutions must have a rigorous
internal control of high integrity and independence. Also, whistle-blowers should not only
be tolerated but also protected and encouraged. The ordinary citizen needs access to an
effective complaint mechanism and appellate procedure to be able to avoid involvement in
corrupt practices. The independence of the judiciary must be coupled with the account-
ability of prosecutors and judges.
Official documents should be available to the public. The amount of politicians' and
officials' salaries should be public information as well as any conflicts of interest and political
contributions. These persons should also be obliged to declare their assets. Procedures for
recruitment and promotion of officials should be transparent. Accounting practices should
allow for the transparency of delivery of public services. There should be mechanisms that
enable the tracing, seizure, and forfeiture of illicit earnings from corrupt activities.
Public procurement practices deserve special attention.39 Tendering companies should be
given a possibility to inspect tender documents once the procedure is concluded, and rea-
sons for procurement decisions should be put forward. Price comparisons of similar projects
in different countries, so-called benchmark cost estimates, may point at cost increases due
to bribes.
C. THE BUSINESS SECTOR
In addition to the official regulation of business, there is a need for corporate codes of
conduct, which, among other things, may promote integrity in business practices. Such
codes can be effective to the extent that they are embedded in the corporate culture and
are not merely a piece of paper. Many small companies operate in the informal sector. The
elimination of barriers to the formal business sector would reduce opportunities for cor-
ruption and provide increased security and access to social security systems. State capture
is, to a large extent, unleashed by a weak protection of property and contractual rights. If
38. Accountability is a key concern of most developmental institutions. A.NT-CORRUPTION PRACTICE NOTE,
surpa note 5, 3f, 13.
39. KLITGAARD ET AL., supra note 37, at 101, 117.
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businesses cannot rely on such rights, they are inclined to protect their interests using
bribes.
D. TAx ADMINISTRATION
Corruption is an effect of a weak state, and a state is weak if it lacks resources. A state
cannot function if it is unable to collect taxes.- Without resources, a state cannot pay
reasonable salaries and cannot maintain effective public institutions, such as providing ad-
equate premises or equipment for law enforcement agencies. For revenue collection to be
effective, the tax authorities must be clean. The willingness of people to pay taxes depends
on their faith in the tax administration. In many cases, this is where an anti-corruption
program should start.
E. THE SUPPLY SIDE
Most corrupt acts involve a bargain between a public official and some private actor.
Measures of the kind that have so far been dealt with take aim at conditions in the countries
that have a high level of corruption. But do not forget about the supply side, such as
corporations and powerful interest groups in the industrialized world who pay bribes. Much
of the grand corruption in the south and east has its roots in these countries, for instance,
corruption related to arms sales, extraction of oil and gas, as well as mining. For the fight
against corruption to be effective, it must also target the supply side. The OECD and the
UN conventions have such an orientation and there are organizations-such as TI and the
British Department for International Development (DFID)-that stress such an approach.
E CRIMINAL LAW AND OTHER SANCTIONS
In order to effectively combat corruption, it is necessary to focus on the workings of
institutions, not individuals. Penal law is therefore of less importance than one might think.
This is not to deny, however, that the criminal prosecution of corrupt activities-and as-
sociated activities, such as money laundering-may give the business community a strong
signal, particularly if high level directors of a company are charged. For example, collusive
corruption-for instance, that are bribes paid in a tender procedure-is more difficult to
detect than extortive corruption. To charge high-level individuals, whether in business,
public institutions or politics, with collusive corruption increases the trust of ordinary peo-
ple in the system and consequently their support in the fight against corruption.
There is room for a number of other sanctions, which may be easier to impose than
criminal law sanctions. Examples are blacklisting of corrupt firms and seizure and forfeiture
of the illicit earnings resulting from corruption, whether inside the country or abroad.
G. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Quite a number of anti-corruption conventions are now in force or have at least been
signed; the most important one is perhaps the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions that entered into force in 1999.
40. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 33, at 333.
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The convention obliges the signatory states to make it a crime to pay bribes overseas (but
not to receive bribes).4' The UN Convention of December 2003 is the only convention
adopted at the global level. 42 Also the Organization of American States, the Council of
Europe, and the African Union have adopted anti-corruption conventions.
43
These instruments are often alleged to be rather ineffective, having weak mechanisms
for accountability. To some extent that might be true, but it is often overlooked that they
affect the societal discourse. They make it less acceptable that companies use bribery as a
method of business. In addition, to the extent that agreements make it easier to seize prop-
erty in any country where a bribing company has property and to make bribery a criminal
offence even if it was committed outside the prosecuting country, the net effect is still
positive.44
H. SPEciAL ANTI-CORRUPTION BODIES
There are quite a number of special anti-corruption bodies.45 Positive experiences have
been cited in connection with anti-corruption bodies invested with broad investigative and
prosecutorial powers. The Independent Commission Against Corruption in Hong Kong
and the Singapore Corrupt Practices Investigations Bureau are both recognized as having
meant a lot for the successful fight against corruption in their respective countries. 6 Such
a special body has also had some success in Bolivia. Indonesia is another example where a
special body has been instituted, and a special court for corruption cases has been estab-
lished. The experience of Indonesia is reasonably good too.
However, the picture is quite different in Kenya as the following quotation by the
Attorney-General of Kenya demonstrates:
The government has this morning formed an anti-corruption squad to look into the conduct
of the anti-corruption commission, which has been overseeing the anti-corruption task force,
which was earlier set to investigate the affairs of a Government ad-hoc committee appointed
earlier this year to look into the issue of high level corruption among corrupt Government
Officers.4
7
It is disputed whether a general case can be made for special bodies.4 s Such bodies may
seem to be the only practical solution in highly corrupt countries provided that they enjoy
support from the highest political level as well as complete independence to investigate the
highest level of government. On the other hand, the success stories that can be recorded
41. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Anti-Bribery Convention, http://
www.oecd.org (last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
42. United Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions,
G.A. Res. 51/191, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/191 (Feb. 21, 1997).
43. United Nations Convention Against Coruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/Res/58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003).
44. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 33, at 328.
45. Examples are Australia, Bolivia, Botswana, Hong Kong, Indonesia,Jamaica, Kenya, Singapore, Thailand,
and Uganda. See JEREMY POPE, CONFRONTING CORRUPTION: THE ELEMENTS OF A NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM
307 (2000).
46. ANTI-CORRUPTION PRACTICE NOTE, supra note 5, 9 12.
47. Daniel Kaufmann, Revisiting Anti-Corruption Strategies: Tilt towards Incentive Driven Approaches?,
in Corruption and Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries 63, 64 (1998), availableathttp://
magnet.undp.org/Docs/efa/corruption/Chapter04.pdf.
48. SHAH & SCHACTER, supra note 35, at 42.
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cannot always be attributed to the special bodies as such. In many cases the progress was a
result of a resolute effort to fight corruption, where the special body has been only one of
several reform initiatives.
I. LEGISLATION AND LEGISLATIVE TECHNIQUE
Many countries do not have the crime bribery but may have an efficient legal system for
fighting corruption nonetheless. Acts in one country regarded as corruption might in an-
other country be classified as fraud, embezzlement, or misconduct. As stated above, the
entire legal fabric is what counts. The legislative technique is important as well. General
provisions open up for arbitrariness and, hence, for officials to solicit bribes. In particular,
officials in a monopoly position, who wield discretionary powers in the absence of genuine
accountability, have opportunities to solicit bribes. Legislative acts should be published and
made easily available. Authorities should have public manuals for their decision-making and
internal rules of procedure, particularly guidelines for exercising discretion.
XXm. Conclusions
The prospects of a successful fight against corruption have improved greatly over the last
decade or two. Several factors contribute to this advantageous development, such as the
awareness of the damaging effects of corruption, reduced acceptance of corruption, the
knowledge that progress is possible, and the pressure on governments to take action and
the preparedness of many regimes to take action.
Corruption is a phenomenon that easily escapes us because it is difficult to nail down. A
country is poor because it is corrupt, but it is also corrupt because it is poor. Organized
crime and corruption go hand in hand as well. What is the cause, and what is the effect?
There are causal relationships in various directions, but there is an insight that corruption
slows down and diverts investment, distorts competition, is economically inefficient, and is
unfair to poor people. In addition, it fosters uncertainty, unpredictability, and declining
moral values, and therefore creates a governance deficit that impacts on the whole fabric
of society.
There is no easy way to fight corruption. One cannot just identify the root causes and
eradicate them. Each country has its own preconditions; there are no quick fixes or one-
size-fits-all approaches. If there is one single root cause it is human greed. The opportunities
that make corruption possible are also abundant in clean states.
They are clean because they exercise good governance, including a number of factors
that countervail corruption, such as accountability, openness, good leadership, reasonable
over-regulation, good taxation systems and hence financial resources for the states, clear
rules for public procurement, popular participation in governance, etc.
The role of the legal system is to provide the institutional framework-rules as well as
institutions that apply the rules-for good governance. This includes a framework for
accountability, channels for complaints, a clean judiciary, taxation and customs, and good
and secure working conditions for non-governmental organizations and the media, includ-
ing the Internet.
The legal system is the warrant for this type of governance that counteracts corruption.
Criminal law has a role to play, even though it is not as prominent as one may assume. In
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addition, the legal system also has the vital role of overseeing the institutions that fight
corruption and to hold them accountable. Only if this task is accomplished in an effective
way, and is seen as being effective, is it possible to gain and maintain the confidence of the
public. Without such confidence, citizens cannot be expected to reject corruption and ab-
stain from using bribes. In the end, the attitude of the public at large is crucial to the
prospect of success for any effort to fight corruption.
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